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To both the observant visitor and the analyst comparing indicators of economic 
performance  and welfare, Hungary appears to have at least some degree of 
success in  a region where the tremendous difficulties of  systemic transition 
have in many cases taken on crisis proportions. Table 4.1 summarizes some 
indicators of  the economic situation at the end of  1991 that demonstrate the 
point in comparison with other East European countries, leaving aside the Yu- 
goslav republics. 
Official statistical estimates can, of course, be quite misleading these days 
in  Eastern  Europe.  For  example,  the  average  1991 exchange rates,  which 
are used to compute the U.S. dollar value of GDP, may not be close to their 
long-run equilibrium values. Czechoslovakia in particular  has  an extremely 
competitive exchange rate, although it is difficult to project how much real 
appreciation is likely and warranted over the next few years. The real size of 
the emerging, still informal private sector is also hard to estimate, and, in some 
countries, the contraction of output and real income is not as catastrophic as 
the statistics seem to indicate. More inclusive measures of economic activity, 
however, would make Hungary look even better. There are now data suggesting 
that it is in Hungary that the small-scale private sector has grown most rapidly. 
Initial findings of  a World Bank-sponsored  research project looking at the 
development of private manufacturing firms in Poland, Hungary, and Czecho- 
slovakia reveal that Hungarian firms have shown dynamic growth. A sample 
of 120  Hungarian manufacturing firms surveyed in September 1991 found that 
production and employment were growing rapidly and that over half the firms 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the World Bank. 
The authors wish to thank GBrard BClanger, Michael Bruno, Andras Horvai, Almos Kovacs, 
and Emest Stem for comments on an earlier draft and Olivier Blanchard for helpful suggestions 
on revising the conference version of this paper. 
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Table 4.1  A Comparison of Macroeconomic  Indicators in East European 
Economies 
GDP Growth 
(%)  Unemployment 
GDP per Capita,  Rate, 
1991 (US.  dollars)  1990  1991  Year-End  1991 (%)  Inflation, 1991 (%y 
Poland  1,800  -12  -8  12  76 
CSFR  2,100  -3  -16  8  59b 
Romania  740  -8  -14  4  220 
Bulgaria  830  -12  -23  10  430 
Albania  520  -10  -30  N.A.  80 
Hungary  3,300  -4  -10  8  35 
Source: World Bank staff estimates. 
Note:  CSFR = Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. N.A. = not available. 
”Annual average change in the CPI. 
bReflects  large once-and-for-all adjustments early in the year, with very low inflation in the second 
half of the year. 
were exporting. Small-scale private-sector activity is also developing in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, but in those countries it is still largely confined to services 
and trade. Informal observation confirms and reinforces the message, although 
the evidence can be only anecdotal. Serious problems remain, of course, partic- 
ularly relating to fiscal balance and employment. However, Hungary appears 
to be getting some positive results in a part of the world that is facing the 
economic challenge of the century. 
There is also little doubt that the path followed by the Hungarian systemic 
transformation has been very different from both the theory and the practice 
of the transition policies adopted by the other East European countries.’ Not 
necessarily by  grand design or as a result of  some carefully planned social 
engineering of  the type Vaclav  Klaus (1991, 44) warns us against, but as a 
result of the particular political and historical circumstances prevailing, Hun- 
gary did not engage in any sudden shock therapy. There was no day zero of the 
reform with maxidevaluation, massive price and trade liberalization, and fixing 
of nominal anchors. Structural reforms in the enterprise and financial sectors 
have also proceeded gradually, although the “opening” to foreign private in- 
vestment took place in 1988 and has been wholehearted. Table 4.2 summarizes 
some of the key events and policy actions characterizing the Hungarian sys- 
temic transformation, which most observers agree started in earnest in 1985. 
The table tries to capture some key quantitative aspects of this “gradualism” 
that, ex ante, would look so cautious and insufficient compared with many of 
the radical programs designed for other countries in recent years. 
1. Economic reforms in Eastern Europe have been extensively described (see, e.g.,  Blanchard 
et al.  1991; Fischer and Gelb 1991; and Bruno, in this volume). 125  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 
Table 4.2  Hungary: Indicators of Liberalization and Systemic Transformation 
1985  1987  1989  1990  1991 
Private-sector share of GDP (%) 
Share of imports liberalized (production weights) (%) 
Maximum tariff in manufacturing (%) 
Average tariff (simple average) (%) 
CPI inflation (annual average) (%) 
Real effective exchange rate index (1985 = 100)” 
Share of consumer prices freed (%) 









































Source: Data provided by the Hungarian authorities and World Bank staff estimates. 
aTrade-weighted  index using producer price indexes. An increase signifies an appreciation. 
Again, it should be emphasized that the historical path described in table 
4.2 was just that; it was not the implementation of a theoretical construct but 
the result of uneasy compromises between guardians of  the old regime con- 
stantly loosing ground, “reform Communists” trying to improve the system 
and maintain control, more radical reformers trying to accelerate change, the 
Bretton Woods institutions trying to encourage moves toward freer markets, 
and, finally, since mid- 1990, rather pragmatic center-right politicians seeking 
to accelerate the process of systemic transformation and integration with Eu- 
rope while minimizing social hardship, with their political base more in the 
countryside and the small towns than with the intellectual elite in Budapest.2 
In evaluating the Hungarian experience, it is, of course, important to remem- 
ber that the reform process started very early with the adoption of the New 
Economic Mechanism in 1968 and was never fully reversed, as happened in 
post- 1968 Czechoslovakia. Despite periods of recentralization, particularly in 
the mid-l970s, there is no doubt that Hungary has had much more time to 
develop practices and attitudes conducive to the functioning of  markets than 
most other countries. While the  journey toward private ownership, hard budget 
constraints,  and free markets and prices  started in earnest only in the mid- 
1980s, two decades  of  experiments with  market  socialism  did prepare  the 
gro~nd.~ 
There is, however, more in the Hungarian “story” to think about than just 
the advantages of having started early. True, Hungary did not face the calamity 
of hyperinflation in the period that we are discussing and did not, therefore, 
have to administer stabilization shock therapy the way Poland had to in 1990 
2. This difference between Hungary and Poland was recently emphasized by L. Balcerowicz in 
a luncheon address to the US-Poland Action Commission, Chicago. 
3. For an excellent description in English of the Hungarian reform process until the mid-l980s, 
see Kornai (1986). See also Balassa (1983) and Antal et al. (1987). Hare (1991), Boote and Somo- 
gyi (1991), and Erlich and Revesz (1991) describe the more recent reforms. Many good papers 
written by Hungarian economists are unfortunately not widely known outside Hungary. 126  Kemal DerviS and Timothy Condon 
and Russia has to today. There were, and are, however, real choices to be made 
regarding the speed of  trade liberalization, the timing and form of  fiscal re- 
forms, exchange rate policy, and policies vis-A-vis the enterprise sector, includ- 
ing the tactics of  privatization and the governance of  enterprises remaining 
public. In these areas, Hungarian reforms followed a sequence and yielded 
certain results that we will describe in the paper. 
The objective of this paper is not to take the years 1990 and 1991 and com- 
pare, using normative objectives, Hungarian performance with, say, Czecho- 
slovak or Polish performance. Other authors in this volume and elsewhere at- 
tempt such a comparison. The recent phase of the Hungarian experience is, 
however, extremely interesting in itself, even if rooted in a particular historical 
and national setting, and even if it is not replicable by others at different times 
and is propelled by different political dynamics. 
4.1  Balance of Payments and Debt: Success after Walking a Tightrope 
By 1987, Hungary’s total external debt had reached $20.5 billion, amounting 
to 75 percent of GDP and 3 12 percent of convertible-currency exports, putting 
Hungary into the group of the very highly indebted countries. Table 4.3 com- 
pares indicators of  indebtedness for some of  these countries, with Hungary 
appearing as one of the most difficult cases. Looking at the numbers in late 
1987, many predicted that Hungary would go by the then familiar route of debt 
renegotiations, reschedulings, attempts at debt reduction, etc. Alone in this 
group, Hungary remained current and did not reschedule or ask for debt reduc- 
tion. In 1991, an improvement can be perceived, at least in the ratios of debt 
and debt service to convertible-currency  exports (which fell to 187 and 35 per- 
cent, respectively), and Hungary emerges in 1992 with a much strengthened 
balance of payments and good renewed access to international capital markets, 
a story worth telling, with some unusual features. 
During  1987-90,  with 1990 being the worst year, Hungary was walking a 
tightrope, always very close to a liquidity crisis, with the ratio of debt service 
to convertible-currency exports one of the highest in the world. Table 4.4, sum- 
marizing the evolution of Hungarian debt by type of creditor, shows how im- 
portant the Bretton Woods institutions, with associated cofinancing from the 
Japanese Export-Import Bank, were in supporting Hungary’s strategy of  re- 
maining current and ayoiding rescheduling. In  the four years from January 
1987 to December 1991, the net exposure of private creditors was almost un- 
changed, while the net exposure of the Bretton Woods institutions, including 
cofinancing arranged with the Export-Import Bank of Japan, increased by $1.4 
billi~n.~  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported Hungary through 
two standby arrangements in 1988 and 1990 and a three-year extended arrange- 
4. In special drawing rights (SDRs), private exposure declines, and the overall increase in debt 
is somewhat smaller. 127  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 
Table 4.3  Debt Indicators for Selected Highly Indebted Middle-Income 
Countries (%) 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Argentina: 
DebVGDP 
Debtkxports of GS 
Total debt servicekxports of  GS 
DebUGDP 
Debtkxports of GS 
Total debt servicekxports of GS 
Debt/GDP 
Debtkxports of GSa 
Total debt servicekxports of GS" 
Debt/GDP 
Debtkxports of GS 
Total debt servicekxports of  GS 
Philippines:b 
Debt/GDP 
Debtkxports of GS 
Total debt service/exports of GS 
Debt/GDP 
Debtkxports of GS" 
Total debt service/exports of  GSa 
Debt/GDP 
Debtkxports of  GS 




































































































































Sources: World debt tables, 1991 World Bank database, and data provided by  the Hungarian au- 
thorities. 
Note: GS = goods and services. 
"For Hungary and Poland, debt stock and service and export figures are in convertible currency 
only. 
bDebt and debt service reduction agreements were concluded with Mexico and the Philippines 
in 1990. 
ment in 199  1, the latter for $1.5 billion. Cumulative World Bank support was 
even more substantial, with commitments of $1.8 billion, including three loans 
for balance-of-payments support for a total of $650 million. 
In mid-1990, this substantial effort on the part of the Bretton Woods institu- 
tions was complemented by  a three-year, $1 billion loan from the European 
Community (EC), linked to the performance criteria and policy commitments 
agreed on with the IMF and the World Bank. If the end result of this massive 
multilateral support had been merely a substitution of official for private debt, 
with no real breakthrough in underlying creditworthiness, one would be justi- 128  Kemal Derviv and Timothy Condon 
Table 4.4  Composition and Evolution of Hungary’s External Debt (US$ 
millions) 
Total Change, 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991”  1987-91 
Total  debt 
World Bank and cofinancing 
IMF 
Bilateral and other 
multilateral 
Commercial 
Medium and long term 
Short term 
Nonconvertible debt 
20,530.9  20,184.8  20,751.0  21,505.9  22,812.1 
976.9  1,146.9  1,275.4  1,624.5  1,999.5 
808.5  634.2  456.2  329.6  1,214.9 
509.7  613.5  718.5  1,090.0  1,791.5 
17,289.2  17,207.7  17,940.2  18,271.8  17,652.2 
14,186.5  13,844.7  14,633.7  15,331.3  15,475.0 
3,102.7  3,363.0  3,306.5  2,940.5  2,177.2 









Source: Estimated data provided by the Hungarian authorities. 
“Estimated. 
fied in questioning the wisdom of the strategy supported by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. A convincing breakthrough did, however, come in 1991, notwith- 
standing the regional economic collapse affecting Eastern Europe and what 
was then the Soviet Union. 
The breakthrough has two components, which are seen in the evolution of 
the balance of payments (table 4.5). Comparing the 1991 results with the 1987- 
89 averages, with  1990 viewed as a transition year, and treating 50 percent 
of  private transfers as a form of portfolio in~estment,~  there is a $1 billion 
improvement in the adjusted current account and a $1.9 billion turnaround in 
the extended capital account. These figures taken together represent $2.9 bil- 
lion, about 10 percent of  GDP. 
The current account improvement was due to rapid export growth to Western 
markets, the improvement in the balance on the travel account, and the com- 
pression of import demand. Exports to convertible currency markets increased 
by 25 percent in volume in 1990-91.  Several factors have contributed to the 
growth of exports. First, with the transformation in 1991 to world prices and 
convertible currencies as the basis for this trade, there was an 87 percent con- 
traction in ruble exports in the first ten months of 1991 (table 4.6). The peculiar 
modalities of ruble exports, especially the operation of  the prompt payment 
system that guaranteed payment in domestic currency as soon as documents 
were presented at the Central Bank that the goods had crossed the border, made 
ruble exports a main factor fueling the expansion of liquidity (with effects on 
the balance of payments in convertible currencies) in 1989. Policy anticipated 
the decline of ruble trade; in 1990, ruble export licenses were sharply curtailed 
5. Private transfers in both 1990 and 1991 are in fact a mixture of misrecorded current account 
receipts (services, tourism, and small-scale exports) and portfolio investments, which increased 
rapidly following the liberalization of restrictions on resident holdings of foreign exchange depos- 
its in 1989 and the passage of the Foreign Investment Act in 1988. 129  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 
Table 4.5  Convertible-Currency  Balance of Payments, Capital Flows, and 
Reserves (U.S.$ millions) 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Adjusted current account  -981  -919  -1,563  -236  -163 
Capital account  332  978  1,525  -177  2,883 
Direct foreign investment”  ...  ...  180  701  1,925 
Net medium- and long-term 
borrowing  1,194  716  1,357  91  1,668 
Net short-term capital  -778  288  -44  -893  -617 
Net capital, not elsewhere included  -84  -26  32  -76  -83 
Changes in net reservesb  547  -174  -88  413  -2,720 
Memorandum items 
Total international reserves  2,159.2  1,976.3  1,725.3  1,166.5  4,017.3 
Reserves in months of  imports‘  4.1  3.5  2.6  2.0  3.7 
Net private transfers  102  115  126  727  866 
Noninterest current account (% of GDP)  1.3  1.8  .6  5.5  5.9 
Source: Data provided by the Hungarian authorities. 
%lcluding  50 percent of  net private transfers in 1990 and 1991. 
bA minus sign indicates an increase. 
‘Imports of goods and services. 
to halt the further buildup of accumulated ruble trade surpluses, giving produc- 
ers a year to try to find new markets. 
The end of  the ruble trade, apart from filling some orders left over from 
1990, created an  “export or perish” mentality among Hungarian exporters. 
This led to an aggregate trade diversion from the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) toward the EC, as shown in table 4.7. Disaggregated Hun- 
garian customs data show an even more pronounced decline in the former 
CMEA share (excluding the former East Germany). In industrial branches with 
a significant CMEA export orientation-mining  and machinery-as  well as 
in the agriculture sector, a large export shift to European markets occurred in 
1991. However, the decline was not across the board, and nonruble exports to 
the countries of the former CMEA were equivalent to $1.2 billion in the first 
10 months of  1991. 
The expansion of  new,  export-oriented businesses also contributed to the 
strong export performance. This, in turn, was made possible by the liberaliza- 
tion of private-sector activity with the passage of the Company Act in 1988 
and the near total liberalization of foreign trading rights in 1991. The growth 
in the number of  economic organizations-from  10,000 at the beginning of 
1989 to over 50,000 in  1991-and  in the number of private entrepreneurs- 
from 225,000 to 340,000 during the same period-has  swelled the number of 
individuals and organizations with foreign trading rights tenfold to 30,000 in 
1991. Small exporters (those with fewer than fifty employees) accounted for 
69 percent of  the increase in the value of  nonruble exports in  1991 as their 130  Kemal DerviS and Timothy Condon 
Table 4.6  Growth of Exports (index with 1990 January-October  = 100) 
Ruble  Nonruble  Total  Share  Ruble  Nonruble  Total 
Mining: 
CMEA 
Europe”  and others 
Total 
CMEA 








Europe’ and others 
Total 
CMEA 
Europea  and others 
Total 
CMEA 
Europe’ and others 
Total 
CMEA 




Europe” and others 
Total 
CMEA 
























































































480  44 
614  56 
1,094  100 
...  ... 
...  ... 
...  ... 
11,203  20 
44,233  80 
55,436  100 
38,276  25 
114,017  75 
152,293  100 
865  6 
12,464  94 
13,329  100 
13,540  14 
84,426  86 
97,966  100 
5,922  7 
78,018  93 
83,940  100 
173  6 
2,628  94 
2,801  100 
26,545  25 
81,752  75 
108,297  100 
846  61 
545  39 
1,391  100 
7,944  19 
33,279  81 
41,223  100 
0  ... 
5,373  100 
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Table 4.6  (continued) 
Ruble  Nonruble  Total  Share  Ruble  Nonruble  Total 
Total: 
CMEA  15,140  90,658  105,798  19  14  390  82 
Europe” and others  386  456,981  457,367  81  2  144  138 
Total  15,526  547,639  563,165  100  13  162  122 
Source; Data provided by the Hungarian authorities. 
*Including  East Germany. 
Table 4.7  Direction of Exports 
Shares of Total Exports (%)  Annual Change (%)” 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991b  1988  1989  1990  1991‘ 
EC  19.8  22.5  24.7  33.5  40.3  18.1  6.7  34.5  42.0 
CMEA  50.2  44.8  40.8  30.2  25.7  -7.1  -11.4  -26.7  -4.8 
Other  30.0  37.7  34.5  36.3  34.0  13.4  2.7  4.5  12.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  4.1  -2.7  -.8  16.0 
Source: IMF direction of trade statistics. 
ah  U.S.  dollar value. 
bThrough the third quarter. 
c1991:3  compared with 1990:3. 
share of  total-exports rose from only 3 percent of  total nonruble exports in 
1990 to 29 percent in  1991 (table 4.8). The growth of  small exporters was 
particularly strong in the large exporting sectors, machinery, chemical industry, 
light industry, and food processing. Although enterprises with export proceeds 
of less than $0.5 million accounted for only 4 percent of total exports, incre- 
mental exports from this size group accounted for over 9 percent of the growth 
in total export proceeds between 1989 and 1991 (table 4.9). 
Better  international  trading  conditions  should  also be mentioned  in dis- 
cussing Hungary’s export success. The trade protocol signed with the EC in 
1988 lowered quantitative import restrictions on Hungarian products entering 
the EC, with some exceptions, including textiles and iron and steel products. 
And, in 1991, Hungary became an associate member of the EC, with full mem- 
bership expected within five to ten years. Hungary’s “Europe Agreement” pro- 
vides for the establishment of a free trade area in industrial goods, enhanced 
access for agricultural  products,  and eventual free trade  in services. Other 
countries, notably the United States, have concluded trade agreements and ex- 
tended GSP (general system of preferences) and MFN (most-favored nation) 
status to Hungary. 
While there has been a significant improvement in the current account, it 132  Kemal DerviS and Timothy Condon 
Table 4.8  Structure and Growth of Exports, 1991 (millions of current forints) 
Jan. 1991-Oct.  1991  Exports of Jan. 1990-Oct.  1990 
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Table 4.8  (continued) 
Jan. 19914ct. 1991  Exports of Jan. 1990-Oct.  1990 
Ruble  Nonruble  Total  Ruble  Nonruble  Total 
Small enterprises 
























































































1,440  1,366 
28  26 
3  3 
150  147 
160  127 
96  76 
565  50  I 
153  153 
106  106 
943  943 
162  122 
120  90 
1,120  936 
Source: Szabo (1992). 
Note: Small enterprises are those with fewer than 50 employees. 
Table 4.9  Distribution of Exporters by Value of Exports 
1989  1991' 
No. of  No. of  Contribution to 
Value of  Exports  Enterprises  Total Exportsb  Enterprises  Total Exportsb  Growth (%) 
> $10 million 
$5-$10  million 
$4-$5  million 
$3-$4  million 
$2-$3  million 
$1-$2  million 
$.5-$1  million 
<  $.5 million 
Total 
136  4,421,848 
97  698,530 
33  142,155 
72  248,214 
91  217,940 
170  244,27  1 
205  148,476 
1,899  172,425 




























Source: Kopint-Datorg, Budapest. 
"Estimate. 
bThousands of U.S. dollars. 134  Kemal DerviS and Timothy Condon 
should be emphasized that the situation remains fragile. Import demand could 
respond vigorously to an overall upturn in economic activity, and only contin- 
ued good export performance would allow the consolidation of the recent im- 
provement in the current account in a context of sustained economic growth. 
In this context, we recommend a supportive and competitive exchange rate 
policy. Significant real appreciation would endanger continued good export 
performance and the resumption of growth. 
The elements of the breakthrough emerging from the extended capital ac- 
count were the increase in private transfers and foreign direct investment, both 
of which were negligible prior to 1990. Administrative restrictions on resident 
holdings of foreign exchange were eliminated in late 1989, and the resulting 
surge in private transfers in 1990 was partly fueled by residents shifting foreign 
exchange holdings from “under the mattress” into the banking system. How- 
ever, the activity of the expanding private sector-especially  the establishment 
of joint ventures with foreign partners-helped  sustain private transfers  in 
1991. Even more important than these transfers, the growth of direct foreign 
investment in 1991 is one of the most encouraging signs of Hungary’s break- 
through,  and there  are many reasons for it, including Hungary’s hospitable 
business climate, privatization policies, and the longer history of greater open- 
ness toward the West (for a discussion of privatization, see sec. 4.3 below). 
Overall, the strength of private transfers and the remarkable growth of for- 
eign direct investment represent a vote of confidence in the sustainability of 
the turnaround in Hungary’s external position  and prospects in the internal 
market. The breakthrough in the balance of  payments significantly strength- 
ened the international reserve position and helped Hungary regain solid access 
to international commercial capital markets, a vindication of Hungary’s debt 
strategy in the eyes of the rest of the world. It has also disarmed domestic 
criticism of the National Bank of  Hungary (NBH) for its policy of  punctual 
repayment of the debt. Such criticism started during the election campaign in 
1990 and became sharp when the Polish debt write-off was announced in early 
1991. The growth of convertible-currency exports mitigated the decline in real 
GDP, thus helping preserve social peace and political stability. Things were 
bad in 1991, but looking at their former CMEA partners, Hungarians could 
take comfort from the observation that they could have been much worse. 
4.2  Industrial Performance and Internal Adjustment 
As noted by  Rodrik (in vol. 2), almost all Hungary’s real GDP decline in 
1991 could be attributed to the CMEA shock. Industrial production fell by 21.5 
percent in  1991, with some of the largest declines in the sectors most depen- 
dent on the former CMEA market (table 4.10). 
Enterprise adjustment has resulted in job losses and growing unemployment 
but also real wage declines. Employment in the industry sector declined by 
13.4  percent in 1991. Total unemployment increased from 1 percent at the end 135  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 





Production”  Employment  Productivity  Real Wagesb  1989  1990 



















-  15.9 
-5.5 
-18.4 
-  16.8 
-  12.8 
-7.3 
-  13.5 
-7.1 
-  13.4 
6.0 
-2.9 







10.5  3.5  2.1 
3.9  1.1  .2 
.2  17.9  12.8 
-2.3  75.6  56.4 
-8.1  6.3  3.1 
-5.0  30.4  25.3 
.4  26.8  15.3 
4.6  36.6  25.5 
-1.4  37.2  25.0 
Source:  Central Statistical Office, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Ministry of  Finance, and World 
Bank staff calculations. 
Covering enterprises with more than 50 employees. Including enterprises with fewer than 50 
employees would result in a decline of 19.1 percent for “total industry” in 1991. 
bProduct wages. 
‘Current forints. 
of  1990 to 8 percent in December 1991. Bankruptcies are also on the rise. 
Liquidation of 1,268 firms was begun in 1991, and the process was completed 
for 480 enterprises. The corresponding figures for 1990 were 630 and 206. 
Industry-wide real product wages declined by  1.4 percent (table 4.10), which 
stands in marked contrast with the Polish experience in  1991 (see Berg and 
Blanchard, in  this volume). In  1990 and 1991, wage policy relied on a tax- 
based incomes policy, which taxed excessive wage increases at the enterprise 
profit rate (40 percent). However, such policies have failed in Hungary in the 
past, and we  suspect that it was probably the tightening of enterprise cash 
constraints resulting from the CMEA shock that forced enterprises to limit 
wage increases. 
Evidence of tighter cash constraints abounds. First, gross and net enterprise 
profits and retained earnings, all expressed in relation to GDP, deteriorated in 
1991 following even larger declines in 1990 (table 4.11). Second, as in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, enterprises have used financial maneuvers to cushion the 
real shock, such as the buildup of interenterprise credit and payment arrears, 
including to the government. The NBH reports that, in general, companies are 
far in arrears with their contributions to the Social Security Fund (see NBH 
1991, 44), and, according to unofficial reports, interenterprise credit adjusted 
for expost producer price inflation, after falling slightly in 1990, increased by 
about 20 percent in 1991, although this increase was far less than that recorded 
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Table 4.11  Enterprise Profits, 1986-91 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  199Ia 
Gross domestic product 
Less gross labor income 
Less indirect taxesb 
Plus indirect subsidies‘ 
Gross operating surplus of 
Less other deductionsd 
Gross enterprise profits 
before taxes 
Less depreciationc 
Net enterprise profits before 
Less direct taxes on income‘ 
Plus subsidies received 
Less profit sharing 
Net retained earnings 
Memorandum items 
Gross labor income 
Indirect taxes 
Indirect subsidies 
Gross enterprise profits 
Direct taxes 




1,088.8  1,226.4 
515.4  561.2 
364.8  415.7 
219.2  238.8 
427.8  488.2 
53.1  50.1 
374.6  438.1 
103.9  111.0 
270.8  327.1 
221.3  267.1 
7.4  8.2 
15.3  16.3 
41.6  51.9 
47.3  45.8 
33.5  33.9 
20. I  19.5 
34.4  35.7 
20.3  21.8 
3.8  4.2 
1,409.5  1,730.4 
676.4  792.2 
524.0  649.9 
217.2  201.5 
426.3  489.8 
46.4  36.5 
379.9  453.3 
118.4  151.7 
261.5  301.6 
155.5  186.6 
2.9  3  .O 
21.4  22.4 
87.5  95.6 
48.0  45.8 
37.2  37.6 
15.4  11.6 
27.0  26.2 
11.0  10.8 
6.2  5.5 
2,080.9  2,494.0 
974.1  1,268.0 
759.5  819.1 
178.2  142.3 
525.5  549.2 
66.7  70.4 
458.8  478.8 
160.8  178.3 
298.0  300.5 
192.0  186.0 
2.4  1.1 
32.7  27.5 
75.7  88.1 
46.8  50.8 
36.5  32.8 
8.6  5.7 
22.0  19.2 
9.2  7.5 
3.6  3.5 
Sources: Central Statistical Office, Stutisricul Yearbook; and Ministry of  Finance. 
Note: Figures are given in terms of billions of forints, except for “memorandum items:’  which are 
given in terms of percentage of GDP. 
“Estimate. 
bTaxes on production and on factors of  production. 
‘Consumer price subsidies paid by the state budget, local governments, and social security (for 
medicines). 
dIncluding allocations to welfare and cultural funds and to voluntary funds for import price equal- 
ization. 
‘Excludes depreciation of state flats. 
qncludes tax on profits, wage.tax, tax on fixed assets, and investment tax. 
rowing  of  Hungary’s  access  to  international  commercial  credit  markets 
The NBH’s blacklist of companies in a “permanent state of imminent insol- 
vency” for which it refuses to discount bills of exchange grew from 281 enter- 
prises at the end of  1990 to 716 by the end of  1991. It is also noteworthy that 
a market in financial information about enterprises has developed, presumably 
because this information can reduce transaction costs in privatization. A maga- 
zine that publishes the names of delinquent debtors and the amounts owed was 
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Fig. 4.1  Hungary: Interenterprise credit 
Source: National Bank of  Hungary. 
started in  1991. An  enterprise specializing in factoring has also been estab- 
lished. 
The government has come under increasing pressure to take measures that 
help “manage” the transition. Some hard-hit branches of industry have been 
granted temporary one-year import protection. Tariffs were raised on imported 
televisions and cement, while a quota was introduced on steel imported from 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the former Soviet Union. Recognizing that the 
commercial banks will feel the crisis in the industrial sector, but unable to 
determine what the size of the problem has been, the government has under- 
taken to guarantee 50 percent (Ft 10 billion, or about $130 million) of the debts 
inherited by the banks when the two-tier banking system was created in 1987. 
Bad loans made after that will be provisioned out of  taxable income over a 
three-year period. The NBH also opened a special credit facility in  1990 to 
provide additional short-term refinancing credit for commercial banks to help 
break  closed circles of  interenterprise arrears. Additional temporary credit 
facilities and selective government credit guarantees are under consideration 
to mitigate the adverse financial spillover effects on healthy  enterprises of 
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4.3  Hungarian Enterprises and Systemic Reforms 
Beyond the short-term measures designed to cope with the effects of  the 
external shock lies the need to realize the systemic transformation of the Hun- 
garian enterprise sector. It is success in the systemic transformation that can 
lead to an acceleration of growth essentially through much better total factor 
productivity performance. Just as the widening performance gap in total factor 
productivity between market and command economies brought about the de- 
mise of the latter, the expectation of a dramatic increase in productivity growth 
through systemic transformation justifies the painful transition and adjustment 
costs throughout Eastern Europe. 
Despite a great deal of preparatory debate and the abolition of the pure com- 
mand economy in the late 1960s, it was only in the mid-1980s that Hungary 
really became an economy regulated by “horizontal” rather than “vertical” re- 
lations between the majority of economic units. Until then, the fact that enter- 
prise managers were appointed “from above” by bureaucratic superiors meant 
that vertical command relations still constituted the essence of the system, de- 
spite market  contacts and relations between  enterprises. In  1985, with new 
regulations instituting the election of top managers by the employees of most 
firms rather than their appointment by sectoral ministries, Hungary really made 
the qualitative leap to what one can call market socialism with self-managed 
enterprises. 
On the positive side, market relations were strengthened by  the  1985 re- 
forms, and managers really did have a chance to determine most outcomes and 
rewards through market-oriented decisions rather than relations with ministe- 
rial bureaucracies. On the other hand, the incentive structure was not that of a 
Western, capitalist market economy. The 1985 reform led to a virtual elimina- 
tion of the government’s role as “owner,” without establishing an alternative to 
exercise this role, thus eliminating any long-term interest in the preservation 
and appreciation of enterprise capital. This led to pressures for excessive wage 
increases, allowed various forms of decapitalization to become commonplace, 
and created insuperable obstacles for the kind of serious restructuring essential 
for long-term productivity growth and competitiveness. 
Starting in 1988 and 1989, with the final disintegration of the Communist 
power structure in the entire region, Hungary launched the next phase of sys- 
temic transformation, this time with the building of a private ownership econ- 
omy as the explicit objective. 
Characteristically, the Hungarian approach has been pragmatic, ready to ad- 
just policies rapidly to the lessons of experience and unwilling to embark on 
sudden  and  large-scale  social  engineering.  The door  to  privatization  was 
opened with the passage of the 1988 Company Act, which liberalized private 
business activities and permitted the establishment of company forms familiar 
in market economies. There ensued a quite vigorous process of partial self- 
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newly formed joint ventures, leaving the less productive assets and most debt 
in the untransformed parent enterprises, which remained effectively  without 
owners. This process did transform  some state-owned assets into corporate 
form with mixed ownership, rapidly enlarging the private sector. It was open 
to much manipulation and easy profit, however, for those who happened  to 
control enterprises at that particular time, many close to the old Communist 
power structure. It also compounded the problems of the old parent enterprises. 
In the face of substantial public dissatisfaction with the distributional impli- 
cations, the process of privatization was greatly centralized in 1990 with new 
laws attempting to protect state-owned assets and with the creation of the State 
Property Agency (SPA), which was given the responsibility of overseeing all 
privatization and which was also to take an active role promoting and organiz- 
ing direct sales and public offerings to foreign and domestic investors. Hun- 
gary did not consider adopting free distribution or voucher schemes to acceler- 
ate the process of the transformation, but the central bank did put in place a 
subsidized credit line for domestic investors wanting to buy state assets, a mea- 
sure presented to the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly allergic to subsi- 
dized credit schemes, as a limited form of voucher  distribution  B  la Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. To  attract foreign capital, foreign investors were offered 
favorable tax treatment, including five-year tax holidays for some investments.6 
This second phase of the privatization process produced mixed results. The 
excesses associated with unsupervised spontaneous privatization diminished, 
but, despite laudable efforts, the SPA, facing tight budget, skill, and experience 
constraints, was unable to deliver rapid privatization through its own proactive 
programs.  Inside and outside Hungary, the perception  was that privatization 
had been slowed down by too much central control. 
In the  second half  of  1991, the overall strategy  was again readjusted, in 
consultation with the Bretton Woods institutions and as part of a program sup- 
ported by a special adjustment loan from the World Bank. The attitude toward 
self-privatization  and  management  buyouts,  but  with  SPA  oversight,  again 
became  more  permissive,  with  the  emphasis  shifting  from concerns  about 
valuation and distribution to the need for accelerating the emergence of new 
entrepreneurial groups with ownership stakes. Privatization  of  smaller estab- 
lishments in  the  service and retail  sector was also accelerated.  Finally, for 
medium-scale enterprises employing fewer than 300 workers, it was decided 
that privatization could be effected by advisers chosen from a preapproved list, 
6. When the Foreign Investment Act was passed in  1988, 20 percent profit tax relief was avail- 
able to any foreign investor contributing at least 20 percent of the capital to the joint venture or 
Ft 5 million (about $65,000). That incentive was eliminated in  1991. For capital contributions of 
at least Ft 25 million or 30 percent of the entity’s total capital, the tax relief increased to 60 percent 
for the first five years and 40 percent thereafter. Finally, for activities of “special importance,” 100 
percent relief was granted for the first five years and 60 percent thereafter. In 1991, the law was 
changed to limit the maximum period for profit tax relief to ten years. There is also a reinvestment 
incentive available to foreign partners in joint ventures. These preferences will be phased out as 
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subject only to selective expost review by the SPA, thus effectively decentraliz- 
ing the process and freeing scarce SPA management and staff resources for 
efforts directed at the largest enterprises. 
Another major component of  the strategic readjustment that took place in 
1991 has been the recognition of the need for clear ownership and governance 
rules for that part of the enterprise sector that would remain under state owner- 
ship in the near future. Toward that end, virtually all state enterprises will now 
be corporatized-reestablished  under Hungary’s general Company Act-and 
provided with the same governing organs-boards  of  directors-as  privately 
owned companies. This will remove the present different legal treatment of 
public and private enterprises and also facilitate the subsequent privatization 
of many of these enterprises. Most of the corporatized state enterprises will be 
made available for privatization, without any differentiation between foreign 
and local investors. For these “to-be-privatized”  enterprises, ownership will be 
vested with the State Property Agency. A limited number of  enterprises will 
be kept under majority state control for the time being, with ownership to be 
exercised by  the State Asset Management Corporation (SAMC), a separate 
organization reporting directly to the Council of Ministers, which is expected 
to play a different role than the State Property Agency for its much larger 
group of more transient state-owned corporations. All the economies in East- 
ern Europe face a difficult trade-off. On the one hand, they want to move as 
rapidly as possible to true private ownership of productive assets. The convic- 
tion of almost all decision makers, political parties, even labor leaders, is that 
private ownership is desirable and that  “simulating” it by  asking  publicly 
owned entities to behave “as if” they were private does not really work. What 
is often not well understood by  some critics of the privatization process in the 
transition economies is that the obstacle is not political-certainly  not ideolog- 
ical-but  practical. The experience of the last two years shows that even give- 
away  schemes, explicitly designed to achieve maximum speed for privatiza- 
tion,  take  time.  One  simply  cannot  establish  effective forms  of  private 
ownership by decree overnight. 
The trade-off arises because leaving large segments of these economies in a 
state of  limbo, with managers and workers uncertain about their future and 
nobody responsible for the value of the productive assets, inflicts great dam- 
age. But building strong public ownership institutions, renationalizing, would 
also be a dangerous strategy. Why create bureaucracies only to dismantle them 
later when privatization takes place? Each country faces this trade-off, and 
there is no perfect solution. The approach that Hungary has chosen, after con- 
siderable debate and mixed initial results in the enterprise sector, is to have one 
agency, the SPA, with the ovemding objective of rapidly privatizing 80 percent 
of  existing assets. Its role as public owner will be minimal. The new  State 
Asset Management Company, on the other hand, will have to fulfill a longer- 
term public ownership role for a list of assets that are judged difficult to privat- 
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The advantage of  this approach is that it dramatically reduces uncertainty 
for the enterprise and for potential investors. It also gives a clear role to both 
the privatization agency and the asset management corporation. It does not ask 
the same organization to behave as a long-term owner and to divest itself as 
quickly as possible with little regard for anything else. 
It is too early to evaluate the results of these arrangements. Further readjust- 
ments in policies and regulations may well become desirable. A particular con- 
cern may well emerge if the share of foreign buyers remains as high as it has 
been so far. The tax holidays offered to foreign investors have been extremely 
and  perhaps unnecessarily  generous.  The  announcement  that  they  will  be 
phased out from 1994 onward is, in our view, appropriate. The overall results 
achieved by the end of 1991 by Hungary’s privatization and private-sector de- 
velopment policies are, however, quite substantial. More than half of  all for- 
eign investment flows to Eastern Europe (excluding Germany) in the year 1991 
went to Hungary, and close to 30 percent of “formal” GDP is in the private 
sector, compared with  10 percent in 1989. Efforts at counting the informal, 
unrecorded  sector raise  this  percentage  much  higher.  The  next  two years 
should also bring improved governance to enterprises remaining in the state 
sector, with full corporatization for almost all entities. If the reforms succeed, 
the  systemic  transformation  of  the  enterprise  sector from a  mostly  self- 
managed form of market socialism to a mixed market economy with a domi- 
nant private sector and also a large number of commercialized, wholly or ma- 
jority state-owned corporations could be completed before  1995. A sensible 
design is there. The challenge is implementation. 
4.4  Downsizing the Government and Restructuring the Budget 
Commercialization  and privatization  in the enterprise sector is only  one 
component of  the overall systemic transformation in which Hungary and the 
other East European economies are engaged. In all these economies, the share 
of national income intermediated by the government remains very large. Under 
the old regime, low incomes and wages went hand in hand with an appropria- 
tion of profits by the state, which then transferred back parts of the “economic 
surplus” in the form of free or nearly free goods and services available to the 
entire population. Parallel to the systemic transformation in the enterprise sec- 
tor is the need for systematic transformation of the role of government in soci- 
ety: an efficiently functioning market economy requires a “smaller” govem- 
ment. Public revenues should come from transparent and nondistorting taxes 
rather than from an appropriation of the profit wherever it appears, and public 
expenditures should be targeted to the provision of  public goods-national 
defense, environmental cleanup, some public infrastructure-and  to the sup- 
port of the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society, instead of the entire 
population. Note that a small government does not at all mean an ineffective 
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Table 4.12  General Government Size (in % of market price GDP) 
Hungary  Turkeya  Chile  Korea”  Portugal  Germany  Austria  EC Avg.b 
Revenues  61.3  18.4  30.3  18.2  37.1  45.7  46.9  43.6 
Expenditures  63.8  22.8  30.6  16.7  45.3  46.6  44.5  46.5 
Source:  IMF,  Government Finance  Statistics  Yearbook, 1990. Data  are for  1989, except for 
Chile (1988). 
“Central government only. For comparison, Hungary’s central government revenues and expendi- 
tures were 54 percent of GDP and 56 percent, respectively. 
bGDP-weighted average. 
ities and responsibilities decreases, it should become more effective in fulfill- 
ing the important role of providing public goods and supporting the vulnerable. 
The reorientation of government activity is, of course, closely linked to fiscal 
policy and macroeconomic stability. Without this reorientation, it will not be 
possible to achieve a sustainable fiscal balance because the universal entitle- 
ments covering the entire population are inherently incompatible with the reve- 
nues that a modern tax system applied to a market economy can be expected 
to yield. 
Table 4.12 compares the share of  government revenues and expenditures 
in GDP in a selected group of advanced European countries, middle-income 
developing countries, and Hungary. The statistics are not strictly comparable. 
In Hungary, for example, there is considerable double-counting in the accounts 
because of failure to consolidate fully transactions between different levels of 
government. Nonetheless, the broad picture is clear: the share of government 
in Hungary is not only way  above that in countries at similar levels of  per 
capita GDP but even higher than in the advanced West  European welfare 
states. 
It is with the comparisons in table 4.12 as background and the conviction 
that an overall downsizing of the government is desirable that we look at fiscal 
policy over the next few years. First, what is likely to be the “financeable” 
deficit that is consistent with the macroeconomic targets for growth, inflation, 
seigniorage, and external debt?’ What, then, is a reasonable medium-term pro- 
jection  for tax  and other revenues as a share of  GDP? The sum of  the fi- 
nanceable deficit and of total revenues gives us the envelop for aggregate gov- 
ernment expenditures. As we shall see, such calculations lead us to conclude 
that there is a need for quite drastic public expenditure reforms, as total expen- 
ditures must adjust to lower tax revenues and a reduced financeable deficit. 
Stabilizing the rate of inflation at a considerably lower rate and limiting the 
growth of  external debt impose limits on the sources available to the govern- 
ment for financing its deficits. For example, reducing inflation from 35 percent 
7. Van  Wijnbergen (1989) is an early example of the approach of  using the concept of  the 
financeable fiscal deficit to analyze consistent fiscal policy. 143  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 
in  1991 to 10 percent in  1993 will result in a loss of  seigniorage revenues 
equivalent to an estimated 2 percent of GDP, which must be factored into the 
calculation of the fiscal adjustment needed over the next few years8  The extent 
of the required fiscal adjustment is measured by the financeable deficit, which 
is the deficit consistent with the macroeconomic targets for growth, inflation, 
and external borrowing. The financeable deficit compatible with West Euro- 
pean inflation levels and private-sector-led  GDP growth in the 4-5  percent 
range is projected to average 1.5 percent of GDP in 1994-95  (table 4.13). 
The analysis is explicitly medium term in nature. In any particular year, it 
may be possible to finance a larger deficit without triggering much higher in- 
flation or reducing productive investment. This is, in fact, what appears to be 
in  store for 1992-93.  Medium-term consistency  on an  increasingly private 
investment-driven growth path does not, however, leave much room for govern- 
ment deficits in excess of 1.5 percent of GDP. It would be a disaster for Hun- 
gary if the fact that large deficits could be financed in 1992 and 1993 led to a 
belief that noninflationary recovery is possible without a major fiscal effort. 
To translate the required adjustment into policy measures, the financeable 
deficit is split into its two components, central bank profits and the general 
government balance, net of receipts from and payments to the central bank. 
Real central bank profits or losses in Hungary can be approximated by the 
outflow of interest payments on net foreign liabilities, with real receipts on 
domestic credits approximately at zero.9  Real NBH losses are projected to av- 
erage 3.6 percent of GDP in  1994-95  compared with 4.6 percent in  1991, 
reflecting the real decrease in gross external debt and the real increase in inter- 
national reserves. The consolidated state budget is the fiscal aggregate gener- 
ally used in discussions of fiscal policy in Hungary, and the prescriptions for 
adjustment in the general government balance will, therefore, be directly trans- 
lated into adjustments in the consolidated state budget.1° Thus, the consoli- 
dated state budget primary deficit, which was an estimated 1.8 percent of GDP 
in 1991 (the overall deficit of 4.1 percent of GDP less estimated net transfers 
to NBH of 2.3 percent), should move to a surplus of about 2.0 percent in 1994- 
95, an adjustment equivalent to almost 4.0 percent of GDP. 
At the same time, the authorities intend to reduce the tax burden on Hungar- 
ian businesses and citizens, and tax reforms planned for 1992-93 are expected 
8. The detailed calculations are from World Bank (1991, chap. 2). 
9. Real central bank losses arise from the burden of servicing the external debt (67 percent of 
GDP in 1991) and providing credit at below-market interest rates to the non-government sector. 
During 1990, the effective nominal interest rate on National Bank of Hungary refinancing credits 
to the nongovernment sector was 22 percent, while market rates ranged from 27 to 32 percent. 
10. The balance of the general government is determined mainly by the balance of the consoli- 
dated state budget. It comprises the state budget, the Social Insurance Fund, the Housing Fund, 
and, beginning in  1991, the Employment and Solidarity funds. Levels of government excluded 
from the consolidated state budget-budgetary  chapters and their institutes, extrabudgetary funds 
(except for those mentioned above), and local governments-have  not contributed significantly to 
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Table 4.13  The Fiscal Adjustment Required for Macroeconomic Consistency 
(share of GDP) 
1991  Average, 1994-95 
1. Financeable deticit/surplus (compatible with 
Minus 
noninflationary rapid recovery)"  -6.4b  -1.5 
2. Real interest payments on net foreign liabilities'  -4.6  -3.6 
Equals 
3. Consolidated state budget primary deficit/surplus"  -1.8  2. I 
4.  Required fiscal adjustmentd  3.9 
Source: World Bank staff estimates. 
"Minus sign indicates deficit. 
bActual deficit, given by  the consolidated state budget primary deficit net of  transfers from the 
central bank plus estimated losses of the National Bank of Hungary, proxied by interest payments 
on net foreign liabilities, expressed in relation to GDP  not derived from sustainable medium-term 
sources of financing. 
'Minus sign indicates outflow. 
dPlus sign indicates equal improvement. 
to result in a reduction of  revenues equivalent to about 2 percent of  GDP, 
mainly from reforms to increase the neutrality of  the enterprise profits tax. 
Thus, macroeconomic consistency and the revenue implications of planned tax 
reforms require an adjustment in expenditures equivalent to about 6 percent of 
GDP in the medium term. Expenditure reductions of this magnitude could be 
achieved by reducing subsidies, reforming income maintenance programs, and 
privatizing commercial activities currently performed by the public sector. The 
savings that could be achieved by  these measures would likely be partially 
offset by higher outlays on priority spending programs. The expected changes 
in the size and composition of government spending underlying the more am- 
bitious reform program are summarized in table 4.14. Estimating the effect of 
reforms on the overall size of government expenditures is complicated by  the 
fact that the implications of a proper consolidation of accounts cannot be esti- 
mated with great accuracy. However, on the basis of  a preliminary analysis 
of the government accounts, which identities the functional categories where 
double-counting is likely to be a problem, and evidence from other countries 
about what level of  expenditure in these categories would be reasonable, a 
reduction in general government outlays from 58 percent of GDP in  1991 to 
40-42  percent by  1995 could be targeted. This would be closer to the average 
size of government in the EC. The expenditure reforms would also make the 
composition of government spending resemble the EC average more closely 
by shifting expenditures from broad income maintenance programs toward hu- 
man and physical infrastructure, where a social consensus exists on the need 
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Table 4.14  Effect of Budget Reform Proposals (% of market price GDP) 
1991  1995  Change 
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Privatization of profit-oriented CBIs 
Employment and solidarity funds 





Effect of 1992-93 tax reforms 
Revenues of profit-oriented CBIs 
Net budgetary savings 
Adjustment required for macroeconomic consistency 
Memorandum items 
General government expenditures, 1991 
Account consolidation" 
Adjusted expenditures, 1989 
Net expenditure reduction 



















3 to 4 
-7  to -8 
-  12 
1  -6 
0  -3 
.4  -1.1 
.4  -  .3 
.6  -1.9 
0  -1.5 
.6  -  .4 
8  -2 
2  -1 
.2  -1 
.8  -.I 
0  -  1.7 
4 to 5 
2.4  1 
2.1  1 
5 to 6  1 
6 to I  1 
1.3  .5 to 1 
0  -1.5 
-2 
3.5 to 4 
58 
9tO 11 
47 to 49 
I to 8 
39 to 42 
Source: Ministry of Finance and World Bank staff estimates. 
Note: CBI = central budgetary institution. 
'Inadequate accounting of CBI expenditures results in large unclassified expenditure and possibly 
large double-counting of expenditure and revenue. Recorded general public services expenditures 
and other economic affairs and services expenditures are thought to be the most affected accounts. 
In the EC, the average shares of GDP devoted to expenditures on general public services and other 
economic affairs and services are 2.5 percent (ranging from 1.0 percent in Spain to 4.1 percent in 
Ireland) and 1.1 percent (ranging from 1  .O  percent in Ireland to 1.6 percent in the Netherlands), 
respectively. In Hungary, they are 7.5 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively. Proper account consol- 
idation should result in a decline in recorded expenditures (and revenues) in these categories to 
the levels found in the EC, which would imply a reduction equivalent to about 9-1  1 percent of 
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4.4.1  Subsidy Reductions 
Subsidies have come down from 13 percent in 1989 to 7 percent in 1991. 
Continued progress in reducing subsidies should permit their elimination, ex- 
cept for urban public transport and, possibly, agricultural exports. The authori- 
ties intend to reduce subsidies to no more than 4 percent of  GDP in  1993. 
Apart from those already mentioned, all other consumer subsidies, including 
those for housing purchases,  production,  and  enterprise investments in the 
competitive sectors, could be eliminated. Provided that inflation can be sig- 
nificantly reduced as planned,  it  should be feasible to reduce  subsidies to 
around 1 percent of GDP by  1995 (0.6 percent for export subsidies, 0.4 percent 
for passenger transport), which would imply a budgetary savings equivalent to 
6 percent of GDP. 
4.4.2  Reforming Income Maintenance Programs 
Hungary’s numerous, but in some cases poorly designed and administered, 
income maintenance programs  are a legacy of the Communist system. The 
largest programs are the pension system (with expenditures equivalent to 10 
percent of 1991 GDP), the health care system (5 percent), maternity and family 
benefits (a combined 4 percent), and unemployment and labor retraining bene- 
fits (1.4 percent-but,  with unemployment expected to reach 13-15  percent in 
1992-93,  spending is expected to increase to about 2.5 percent of  GDP). To 
address the shortcomings of  the income maintenance  programs  and reduce 
their heavy burden on the budget requires a shift in their orientation. In the 
pension system, for example, reforms are needed to reduce benefits but also to 
protect benefit levels from inflationary erosion, which has been a problem, 
particularly for aged pensioners. In other areas, especially family allowances 
and maternity  and child care benefits, a reorientation  away from broad and 
untargeted  support  toward  smaller programs  where  the  benefits  are  more 
clearly tied to needy beneficiaries is called for. Finally, greater use of incen- 
tives for cost consciousness is needed; the reform of  sick pay benefits to re- 
quire employers rather than the government to pay for the first ten days of sick 
leave is an example. The potential savings from these measures are estimated 
at 4 percent of GDP. 
In view of the difficult adjustment period facing Hungary, it is more likely 
that expenditures on income maintenance  programs will rise sharply in  the 
next two to three years before declining over the medium to longer term. The 
main factor underlying an increase in income maintenance expenditures is the 
expected increase in unemployment in the next two years as a consequence 
of the privatization of state enterprises and the need to restructure enterprises 
previously dependent on sales to the CMEA market. Higher than anticipated 
unemployment in 199  1 caused expenditures on unemployment compensation 
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mum period for which an individual can receive unemployment compensation 
has been reduced from two years to eighteen months, the maximum benefit 
has also been reduced, and the contribution for unemployment insurance has 
been increased from 2 percent of wages in 1991 to 7 percent in 1992, which 
should be sufficient to handle a year-end 1992 unemployment rate of  10 per- 
cent and a peak of  12 percent in 1993. Under such a scenario for unemploy- 
ment, expenditures on job retraining and unemployment compensation could 
increase to the equivalent of nearly 4 percent of GDP in 1993 and then decline 
to 2-2.5  percent by  1995. If  social assistance payments keep pace with the 
growth of unemployment compensation benefits, spending could also rise to 
over 3 percent of GDP in 1993 and decline to about 2 percent by  1995. 
4.4.3  Privatization of Government Commercial Activities 
The privatization of large numbers of government tasks, which has the po- 
tential to give a significant boost to the development of the private sector, has 
yet to begin in Hungary. Lack of progress in privatizing government function 
is partly due to lack of  adequate budget information about the operations of 
the very complicated government structure. The government has little ability 
to monitor or control revenues and expenditures, and improved budgeting is a 
priority. The draft Act on Government Finances is designed to improve the 
reporting  system at all levels of  government and make  it easier to monitor 
government expenditures. 
Budgetary chapters (spending ministries) are responsible for two types of 
institutions, those formed initially in order to administer traditional public- 
sector responsibilities (e.g., education, health, social security, public admin- 
istration, defense, police) and those formed to engage in quasi-commercial 
activities (e.g., water and road management). The former are described in the 
Hungarian system as “interested in the remainder” (surplus); the latter are “in- 
terested in the result” (profit).  ‘I Expenditures by commercially oriented institu- 
tions were the equivalent of  1.7 percent of  GDP in  1990, revenues were 1.5 
percent of GDP, the state budget transfer was 0.3 percent of GDP, and employ- 
ment was 53,000, or 1 percent of the total labor force. These institutions should 
be privatized and government employment reduced by at least 50,000 workers. 
Subsidy reductions, the reform of social welfare programs, and privatization 
of government operations could yield savings equivalent to approximately 12 
percent of GDP by  1995, although higher spending on priority programs and 
the revenue effects of  the  1992 tax reforms could reduce the net budgetary 
savings to 3-4  percent of GDP. This would accommodate the 3.5-4  percent of 
GDP adjustment required for macroeconomic consistency. 
Expenditure management during the transition will be difficult because, 
11. However, some of  those from the first group have important commercial activities. For ex- 
ample, Hungarian television (known in Hungary as MTV) has significant advertising revenues. 148  Kemal DerviS and Timothy Condon 
while it will be easy to increase expenditures in high-priority areas, there is 
likely to be political opposition to the expenditure reductions. In part, this re- 
flects the nature of many of Hungary’s social welfare programs; nearly every- 
one is a beneficiary because targeting is almost nonexistent. The result, as con- 
firmed by analysis undertaken in Hungary of the incidence of the social welfare 
programs,’* is that middle- and upper-class households-wielders  of political 
influence-are  the largest  beneficiaries  of  many  income maintenance  pro- 
grams. Nevertheless, in order that budget reform be carried out in a fiscally 
prudent fashion, measures to reduce expenditures should be introduced prior 
to embarking on reforms that will raise expenditures. The government has tar- 
geted a reduction  in  subsidies equivalent to 3 percent of  GDP in  1992-94. 
Additional reductions could be achieved in subsidies for post- 1989 housing 
purchase loans, provided that inflation can be stabilized. If progress in the Uru- 
guay Round of the GATT negotiations permits, a significant reduction in ag- 
ricultural export subsidies could be made. The privatization of government ac- 
tivities, including the reduction in the government work force, should also be 
accelerated. 
4.5  Conclusion 
Hungary has been able to overcome the debt crisis of  the late  1980s and 
the devastating shock of  collapsing CMEA markets in  1991 without major 
macroeconomic instability and suffering a decline in output that has remained 
moderate when compared with the region as a whole. The turnaround in the 
balance of payments in 1991-92  has been impressive, with Hungary’s perfor- 
mance in attracting direct foreign investment setting a new standard. Present 
fiscal difficulties should not lead one to forget these remarkable achievements, 
which were realized without foreign debt forgiveness. The country’s systemic 
transformation is only half completed, however, and, for Hungary to emerge 
as a full success story, the transformation of the enterprise sector and the re- 
structuring of the budget constitute the twin challenges requiring a huge effort 
in the immediate future. Provided that events unfold as in the programs and 
laws already adopted, after decades of  debate, five years of  serious reforms, 
and a detour through self-management, the new economic “system,” close in 
essence to that of neighboring Austria, Italy, or France, could be in place in the 
near future. If the next round of reforms really takes hold, an unprecedented, 
deep transformation could be achieved with hardship and sacrifice, but without 
massive socioeconomic dislocation. Success seems within reach, provided per- 
severance, renewed courage on the fiscal front, and the ability to reach political 
compromise continue to accompany the cautious realism that has so far charac- 
terized Hungary’s management of the systemic transition. 
12. A team of Hungarian experts has analyzed the effect of taxes and social benefits in cash and 
kind on the distribution of income in Hungary (see Kupa and Fajth 1992). 149  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 
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COmIIleIlt  Kalman Mizsei 
It is not easy to serve as a rapporteur to a paper with which one has such far- 
reaching and fundamental agreement as I have with that of DerviS and Condon. 
The authors’ main message is that Hungary has a fair chance to become a 
gradualist success story, although obviously among some particular, histori- 
cally established circumstances with all the limited lessons that this might have 
for the other transforming countries. I fully agree with this statement and also 
with the choice of the authors to pick it up as the main theme of the Hungarian 
story They are also right when emphasizing that the recent policy style is not 
an outcome of  any “grand design” or “implementation of  a theoretical con- 
struct” but that it has emerged out of different considerations, interests, histori- 
cal situations, etc. 
Furthermore, I also think that the authors have rightly structured their paper 150  Kemal DerviS and Timothy Condon 
around three crucial topics: foreign debt, privatization, and the public budget. 
I  share their view that Hungarian  debt management  has been an incredible 
success so far, in spite of the fact that the story has obviously not yet ended. 
One might also add that the psychological  implications of  this strategy for 
society are also worth noticing: while the undoubtedly justified and right Pol- 
ish debt strategy had the unpleasant side effect of  “spoiling” the elites and 
teaching them that, whatever they do with the country, the West has an “inher- 
ent” duty to help them, in Hungary the public sense is that we have to help 
ourselves. This attitude in itself is an asset. (Again, I do not claim that the 
mentioned side effect would mean that the Poles should not have followed the 
applied debt strategy.) 
The authors are somewhat too benign to the Hungarians when emphasizing 
the toughening of regulation on the ruble trade: during the first half of  1990, 
the policy was sufficiently tough, but this was not the case for the second half 
of the year, when a softer policy created a large trade surplus that was practi- 
cally a form of  implicit aid to the Soviet Union and that strained Hungary’s 
monetary policy. Also, the authors are a bit too nice to the Hungarian policies 
when speaking about bankruptcy: especially the events of the first half of 1992 
show that the institutional system of the country is still not ready to let the 
bankruptcy machinery function properly. Therefore, it will be necessary to re- 
adjust regulation soon; the courts are absolutely unable to cope with the filed 
cases, the chain of microeconomic financial crises is too long, etc. However, 
the other side of the coin is again that Hungary is the only country where this 
stop-and-go process  has  already achieved some significant progress.  I  also 
agree with the authors that, in order to support a revival of industrial growth, 
the policies of real appreciation of  the currency cannot be maintained in the 
longer run. 
It is very pleasant for me to be more critical than analysts of the Bretton 
Woods institutions on issues of Hungarian economic policy. In fact, I am more 
critical of the two remaining issues of the paper: privatization policy and public 
finance. First, for a minor correction, the authors overemphasize the stop-and- 
go nature of  Hungarian  spontaneous privatization. I completely  agree with 
their general attitude toward decentralized privatization. (I can add that it is a 
small satisfaction for me personally  to see that after almost three years the 
message about the necessity of decentralized privatization gets through in the 
Western analyses of East Central European economic transformation.) How- 
ever, one should notice that, even right after the 1990 elections, the flow of 
“spontaneous” privatization cases has not stopped for a minute. We can speak 
only about a minor slowdown. 
Where I really disagree with the authors is their endorsement of the forma- 
tion of a “temporary” large holding company for firms that remain in state 
hands for a while. First, it would be good if only 20 percent of the state assets 
went to the new State Asset Management Corporation  (SAMC). We do not 
have guarantees for that, and there are worrying signals that the share will be 151  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 
more. Certainly, there are a number of firms that will be incorporated into the 
“superholding” for which there is no good justification to remain state owned. 
I am also more womed than the authors that Hungary might repeat the Italian 
or Austrian case where this kind of solution quickly generates clientelist politi- 
cal structures. Then it will be extremely difficult to get rid of these assets even 
when the state can theoretically concentrate on the issue. So I appreciate the 
dilemma presented by the authors, but I would certainly not create those super- 
structures. 
The authors argue that the establishment of the SAMC will divide clearly 
the role of State Property Agency (“divesting itself”) and that of the long-term 
state owner. Again, this might provide the system with some additional cer- 
tainty but at the costs of creating a large institution with a vested interest in 
maintaining state property  in sectors like manufacturing where it obviously 
should not be the owner. 
Nonetheless, I agree with the authors, who find the achievements of Hungar- 
ian privatization so far “quite substantial.” In fact, this is the only privatization 
machinery  in the post-Communist world that has been working steadily and 
with notable successes. The Czech-Slovak mixture might also become quite 
successful because of its pragmatic part (enterprise privatization plans) and if 
the voucher-scheme does not become a major failure. 
Finally, on the budget, the authors’ contribution both  in this paper and in 
their World Bank analysis (World Bank 1991) to understanding the alternatives 
to the recent situation has been very substantial. I think that their reform pro- 
posal is basically realistic and politically feasible. Where I have some doubts 
is their subsidy reduction program: it would probably squeeze the rural sector 
so much that it might cause unbearable social costs because of the extremely 
distorted international markets in agricultural products. Therefore, the reduc- 
tion in general government expenditure from 58 percent of GDP to somewhere 
around 40 percent in four years is also probably too ambitious. It would, in 
fact, be a real shock treatment, something the authors seem to prefer to avoid 
in general. It is also quite questionable whether the expectations of the authors 
on the level of savings on income maintenance programs could be realistic. 
Unfortunately, however, the whole debate is rather theoretical because the 
government has shown already in 1992 that its direction of action is quite the 
opposite to what Den49 and Condon have prescribed in the paper. Revenues 
have fallen further, and no reforms have been started on the expenditure side. 
Therefore, the official budget deficit plan has become totally unrealistic. The 
recent revised plans almost double the deficit target to the range of  5 percent 
of GDP. This might be close to reality. The government lives with the illusion 
that, because high savings ratios make deficit financing possible, they do not 
really need to act until the next elections on the expenditure side; consequently, 
cosmetics will do. 
However, because financial deepening is very modest in postsocialist Hun- 
gary, the crowding-out effect of the deficit is very strong. Interest rates cannot 152  Kemal DerviS and Timothy Condon 
be cut along with the falling rate of inflation. Deficit financing, although quite 
possible, is also very costly because the public is, at the time being, cautious 
about buying government securities. So, the timetable outlined by the authors 
will certainly not be realized,  and general government expenditures will be 
above 50 percent of GDP with an inflation rate much higher than the men- 
tioned  10 percent in  1995. However, after the 1994 election, the new govem- 
ment will certainly be able to use the recent plans of  deficit cuts and lower 
government spending. It is hoped that the macroeconomic situation will not 
deteriorate much so that the “economic miracle” of Hungary can continue be- 
yond 1994. 
Reference 
World Bank. 1991. Hungary: Reform and decentralization of  the public sector. Wash- 
ington, D.C. Mimeo. 
Discussion Summary 
Michael Dooley warned that it is imperative that Hungary start to privatize the 
financial sector. He said that, until that happens, privatized nonfinancial firms 
will enjoy a soft budget constraint because they will have access to credits from 
excessively generous state-run banks. 
Michael Bruno agreed with the authors that Hungary has had a relatively 
successful macroeconomic policy. He noted, however, that there is a gap be- 
tween the objective success of the macroeconomic policy and a widely held 
negative public perception of that policy. 
Olivier Blanchard said that the presentation of  the authors gave the impres- 
sion that Hungary’s reform program has been much more successful than the 
reforms in Poland. Blanchard suggested that this was partially misleading, not- 
ing that foreign direct investment is the only category in which Hungary has 
done overwhelmingly better than Poland. Moreover, whatever success Hun- 
gary has had must be interpreted in light of the fact that Hungary had a substan- 
tial head start in the reform process. 
Je~ey  Sachs also defended the performance of the Polish economy. Sachs 
noted that Poland’s 1991 budget deficit was 2.7 percent of GNP, less than Hun- 
gary’s deficit of 4 percent. Polish GNP fell by 8 percent in 1991, while Hungar- 
ian  GNP fell by  10 percent.  Poland  has  experienced  faster growth  in  the 
private-sector share of GNP and faster growth in the volume of  exports to the 
West. The Polish inflation rate fell in 1991, while the Hungarian inflation rate 
rose. Finally, Sachs noted that the Polish achievements are even more impres- 
sive when one remembers that  Hungary  started its reform program  twenty 
years before the Poles did. 153  Hungary-Partial  Successes and Remaining Challenges 
Andras Simon criticized the authors for overemphasizing the success of the 
gradualist approach. He agreed with other commentators that Hungary’s pur- 
ported success is explained by its early start. 
Kemal DewiJ’s  response covered several topics. First, he noted that the gov- 
ernment is trying to improve the operations of the banking sector both by su- 
pervising and reforming the banks and by eventually privatizing them. Second, 
he emphasized the importance of  the corporation program for the firms that 
will continue to be held under state ownership over the next few years. He 
praised the government for taking the ownership role away from the sectoral 
ministries and creating a new institution (the SAMC, or State Asset Manage- 
ment Corporation) to exercise that role.  He noted  that the existence of  the 
SAMC reflected not ideological opposition to privatization but rather an aware- 
ness of  the practical impossibility of successfully privatizing the entire state 
sector immediately. Third, Dervig addressed the gradualism debate. He said 
that  shock  therapy  is  clearly  the  right  response  to hyperinflation,  but  he 
said that gradualism may be a better approach to trade liberalization. He also 
noted that shock therapy runs the risk that a single shock may not be enough 
to stabilize the economy permanently and that multiple shocks may be more 
costly than a gradual reform program. This Page Intentionally Left Blank